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FEDERAL SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
CHRISTINE GODSIL COOPER*
SHARON BAUER**
On October 13, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.1 The Act has been called "one of the most
significant developments in the field of public administration in this
century." 2 It was also the first significant change in the Civil Service
system since the Pendleton Act of 1883.3 Since the time of the first
Civil Service Act, the total civilian employment in the federal sector
has increased from approximately 131,000 to almost 2.9 million.4 The
Civil Service Reform Act was, in part, an attempt by President Carter
to fulfill his campaign pledge to reorganize the Civil Service to form a
more efficient government.5
There are nine titles to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.6 One
of these, title VII (Federal Service Labor-Management Relations) was
* B.A., Rosary College; M.A., University of Illinois; J.D., DePaul University School of
Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor, Loyola University Law School.
** B.A., University of Dayton; M.S., Wright State University; J.D., Loyola University Law
School; Labor Relations Specialist, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region V, Chicago, Illi-
nois. The authors thank Nancy Tuohy and Vivian Yamagachi for their research assistance.
1. 92 Stat. 1192, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the
CSRA].
2. Frazier, Labor Management Relations in the Federal Government, 30 LAB. L.J. 131, 131
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Frazier]. Mr. Frazier is a member of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, the body established by title VII to administer the new federal labor relations program.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1043, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2723, 2724. The Pendleton Act established the Civil Service Commission, which was
charged with implementing the merit principle in federal personnel practices. Moreover, Con-
gress was to determine the conditions of employment for federal employees. Civil Service Act of
1883, Act of January 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403. See generally E. HAGBURG & M. LEVINE,
LABOR RELATIONS: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE, 164-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HACBURG
& LEVINE].
4. H.R. REP. No. 1043, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2724.
5. President Carter stated that: "I consider civil service reform to be absolutely vital.
Worked out with civil servants themselves, this reorganization will restore the merit principle to a
system that has grown into a bureaucratic maze." President Carter's State of the Union Message,
1978 PUB. PAPERS 90 (January 19, 1978). See ABA Committee Report on Federal Government
Employee Relations, [1978] 61 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 151, 153 [hereinafter referred to as
ABA Report].
6. The nine titles of the CSRA are: I-Merit System Principles; II--Civil Service Func-
tions, Performance Appraisal, Adverse Action; III-Staffing; IV-Senior Executive Service; V-
Merit Pay; VI-Research, Demonstration, and Other Programs; VII--Federal Service Labor-
Management Relations; VIII-Grade and Pay Retention; IX-Miscellaneous.
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enacted in haste with little debate.7 This title, which became effective
on January 11, 1979, is now the basic law governing federal employee
labor relations. 8 Title VII will have a significant impact on the rights of
federal employees to organize and bargain collectively.
This article will present a survey of the history of federal employee
labor relations, along with an analysis of the most recent developments
embodied in the Civil Service Reform Act. The appendices to this arti-
cle present a comprehensive view of the legislative history of the reform
bill and provide a convenient comparison of three sources of labor law:
the most recent executive order applicable to the federal sector; its suc-
cessor, title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the most significant body of labor law
covering the private sector. The appendices invite the reader to con-
sider the present state and future development of federal labor rela-
tions.
UNIONIZATION IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
Unionism among government employees began in the 1830's when
the federal skilled craftsmen joined the private sector unions.9 These
workers found a great deal of resistance from the federal departments
and military heads.'0 In the following years, benefits secured by fed-
eral employees generally resulted from the gains private sector unions
had achieved in industry.I' Unionization in the public sector
progressed slowly; it was not until the 1960's that organized public em-
ployees became prominent as a national labor force. 12 By 1968, one
out of every ten union members in the United States was a government
7. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S 14,266-326 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978); CONG. REC. H 11,820-
827 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); CONG. REC. S17,084 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978).
8. Frazier, supra note 2, at 131.
9. Project- Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
887, 893 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Collective Bargaining Project]. See also HAGBURG &
LEVINE, supra note 3, at 165. For example, approximately one-fourth of all private sector employ-
ees are represented by labor organizations, whereas approximately one-half of all federal employ-
ees are so represented. Id, citing Cohany & Dervey, Union Membership Among Government
Employees, 93 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16 (1970). This union dominance in the federal sector is
particularly striking in view of the unavailability of union security clauses in the federal sector.
See App. 3. However, in 1976 union organizing activity in the federal sector declined somewhat.
ABA Report, supra note 5, at 152-53. See also text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
10. Collective Bargaining Project, supra note 9, at 2.
11. Id. For example, in 1840 President Van Buren issued an election-eve executive order
"awarding government employees the ten-hour day with no reduction in wages." HAGBURG &
LEVINE, supra note 3, at 165. Federal employees continued to press for pay and benefits compara-
ble to those in the private sector. By 1868, federal laborers and mechanics were the beneficiaries
of "prevailing wage" statutes. Id.
12. See Collective Bargaining Project, supra note 9, at 3.
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employee. ' 3 Today, union membership in the public sector has far out-
paced that in the private sector. 14
Unionization of federal employees has historically been an unpop-
ular political subject. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft issued the "gag rule" which deprived government em-
ployees of the right to petition Congress on their own behalf.15 By
1912, however, organized federal postal employees had persuaded
Congress to pass the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 16 which guaranteed not
only the right of federal employees to petition, but also their right to
join unions. 17 Shortly thereafter, in 1917, the first union of non-postal
federal workers was chartered by the American Federation of Labor.'
8
During the 1930's, Congress supported the right of private sector
employees to organize and bargain collectively. 19 However, public sec-
tor unionization was considered a separate issue. Even President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was otherwise friendly to organized labor,
sent a now-famous letter to the National Federation of Federal Em-
ployees in 1937:
All government employees should realize that the process of col-
lective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limita-
tions when applied to public personnel management. The very na-
13. Id.
14. Stieber, Public Employee Unionism.- Structure, Growth, Policy, in 4 LABOR RELATIONS &
SOCIAL PROBLEMS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 8 (2d ed. 1975).
15. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service, in 4 LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL
PROBLEMS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 5 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Hart]. This was by way of executive order:
All officers and employees of the U.S. of every description . . . are hereby forbidden,
either directly or indirectly, individually or through associations, to solicit an increase in
their pay or influence or attempt to influence in their own interests any other legislation
whatever, either before Congress or its committees . . . on penalty of dismissal from the
government service.
Id. at 10.
It has been said that the Coolidge presidency was launched by his well-known opposition to
public employee strikes. When Coolidge was Governor of Massachusetts, he sent a well-publi-
cized telegram to Samuel Gompers, in which Coolidge inveighed against the Boston police strike.
Kennedy & Johnson, Public and Private Employment-A Double Standard, 29 FED. B.J. 11
(1969) [hereinafter referred to as Kennedy & Johnson].
16. See Hart, supra note 15, at 10.
17. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166. This act, however, permitted federal employ-
ees to join only those unions which did not assert the right to strike against the government. See
generally Hampton, Federal Labor-Management Relations. A Program in Evolution, 21 CATH.
U.L. REV. 493, 494 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Hampton].
18. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166. This was the National Federation of Federal
Employees. The relationship between the AFL and the NFEE was short-lived. In 1931, the affili-
ation with the union was severed because of a dispute over job classifications. The AFL then
chartered another union, the American Federation of Government Employees. Id.
19. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4-5
(1976).
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ture and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in
mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The
employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative of-
ficials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many
cases restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules
in personnel matters. 20
In 1960, President Eisenhower's attitude was similar, although less re-
strained:
That public servants might be so unmindful of the national good
as to even entertain thoughts of forcing Congress to bow to their will
would be cause for serious alarm. To have evidence that a number
of them. . . led by a few, have actually sought to do so is, to say the
least shocking.
21
Although private sector employees were covered by the National
Labor Relations Act22 in 1935, federal sector employees were excluded
from its basic protections.2 3 The reluctance to provide collective bar-
gaining rights to the public sector stems from a perception of inherent
differences between private and public employment.
Several theories have been advanced to support the denial of col-
lective bargaining rights to public employees. The sovereignty theory
suggests that the government-employer, as the "ultimate repose of all
legitimate societal power," must not be opposed by the power of labor
unions.24 A second approach is that public employees must sacrifice
their own interests for the public good.2 5 A third concern is that the
division of authority among the many governmental agencies presents
unique problems; for example, how to determine the level and subject
of negotiations. The difficulty of this question is in part due to the
various limits on governmental personnel policies levied by Congress. 2
6
A fourth consideration is the fear that a public employees' strike would
seriously cripple the economic and social concerns of this country and
20. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166.
21. Hart, supra note 15, at 13. President Eisenhower was particularly disturbed that govern-
ment employee unions were exerting political pressures on Congress. Id. at 12-13.
22. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, 61
Stat. 136, 160 (1947), provided for discharge and forfeiture of civil service status and for striking
federal employees. This section was repealed by Pub. L. No. 330, 69 Stat. 624 (1955), re-enacted
in 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-118r (1976) which refers to sanctions against government employees.
24. Edwards, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 359 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as Edwards].
25. Id. at 360. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 883-84
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
26. Edwards, supra note 24, at 361.
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even endanger lives.27 Finally, since the allocation of resources in the
public sector is a political as well as an economic choice, it has been
argued that full collective bargaining in the public sector would give
highly organized groups an unfair advantage in receiving government
funds.28
Although these issues may require special considerations and pro-
visions in a public sector labor relations program, there are fundamen-
tal similarities between private and public organizations: their
constituents, the workers, must have some say in the employment poli-
cies which govern their lives. The right to decent and just working con-
ditions belongs to all employees, regardless of the character of their
employer.
29
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Viewed against a background of animosity toward public em-
ployee collective bargaining, President Kennedy's approach was re-
markable. 30 During his presidential campaign, Kennedy asserted his
belief in the right of federal employees to deal collectively with their
employers. 3' In 1962, President Kennedy issued the first Federal Labor
Relations Executive Order, known as Executive Order 10,988,32 which
attempted to assure both the public interest as well as employee
rights. 3
3
Nonetheless, Executive Order 10,988 assumed fundamental differ-
ences between labor relations in the private sector and labor relations
27. See generally Comment, Public Employee Legislation: An Emerging Paradox, Impact, and
Opportunity, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 931, 935-38 (1976). The first reported federal strike occurred
in 1835, and was followed by dozens more before the end of the nineteenth century. Hampton,
supra note 17, at 493. In 1969, federal air controllers delayed flights for three hours by their mass
"sick-ins." See Kennedy & Johnson, supra note 15, at 112.
28. Edwards, supra note 24, at 363. Edwards discusses and dismisses, at least in part, the
assumed greater cross-elasticity of demand in the public sector, which is the primary natural limit
to private sector union demands. Id. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879, 883-84 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). For a discussion of the issue concerning the
effects of strikes in the public sector as a distortion of the political decision making process, see
Hampton, supra note 17, at 496-97; Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bar-
gaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
29. Edwards, supra note 24, at 364.
30. President Kennedy's position was in large part attributable to the growing political
strength and vigorous efforts of organized labor. See HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 167-
68.
31. Id. at 168.
32. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969).
33. U.S. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE
FEDERAL SERVICE 63 (1975) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as LABOR RELATIONS
COUNCIL].
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in the public sector. The distinctions were thought to require different
degrees of union recognition. Employee organizations in the federal
sector could be recognized in one of three ways: exclusive, formal, or
informal.34 Each type of recognition conveyed a different degree of
rights.35 To be accorded exclusive recognition, an employee organiza-
tion would have to show it had been selected by a majority of employ-
ees.36 Once so recognized, the exclusive representative would be able
to act for and negotiate agreements for covered employees. 37 The gov-
ernmental agency was required to meet and confer with such organiza-
tions at reasonable times on personnel policies and matters affecting
working conditions. 38 If the employee organization could not show a
majority interest but evidenced ten percent employee membership, it
would be afforded formal recognition. 39 This type of recognition re-
quired the agency to consult from time to time on the formulation of
personnel policies.4 0 Any organization ineligible for exclusive or for-
mal recognition could still be granted informal recognition. 41 How-
ever, an informal organization was permitted only to present its views
on matters of concern to its members.4 2 There was no obligation
placed on the agency to confer or consult on the formulation of person-
nel policies, or to negotiate on any matter.
43
Executive Order 10,988 authorized negotiations between govern-
mental agencies and exclusive employee organizations." However, in
marked contrast to the private sector, grievance arbitration was to be
advisory in nature, and it could extend only to the interpretation of the
agreement. Moreover, it could be invoked only with the approval of
the aggrieved employee.4 5 Management rights to direct, hire, fire, pro-
mote, and suspend employees as well as determine the method and
means to carry out the mission of the agency were maintained.46 Ad-
ministration was dispersed: the heads of the executive departments and
34. Exec. Order No. 10,988 §§ 3(a), 4(a), 5(a), 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969). In
the federal sector, labor organizations were given proportional representation rights, in contrast to
the exclusive rights granted the private sector counterpart.
35. Id. §§ 4(b).
36. Id. § 6(a).
37. Id. § 6(b).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 5(a).
40. Id. § 5(b).
41. Id. § 4(a).
42. Id. § 4(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. §§ 6(b), 7, 8(a).
45. Id. §§ 8(b)(1), (2), (3). See generally Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service:
How Final and Binding? 51 ORE. L. REV. 134 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Kagel].
46. Exec. Order No. 10,988 § 7(2), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969).
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agencies, with assistance from the Civil Service Commission, were re-
sponsible for maintaining the program and carrying out the objectives
of the order.47 Executive Order 10,988 continued unchanged as the la-
bor relations policy for the federal sector for seven years.
A study of Executive Order 10,988 was made by a committee in
1969. The researchers reviewed the status of the executive order pro-
gram and recommended changes.48 The committee reported that while
the 1962 order was beneficial to agencies and employees, it failed to
adjust to changing conditions.49 With the growth of union representa-
tion 50 significant changes were deemed necessary to continue a con-
structive labor relations program. 5' The committee recommended, inter
alia, the establishment of a central body to administer the program,
52
expansion of the scope of negotiations, 53 and recourse to a disinterested
third party to resolve unfair labor practice complaints.
5 4
The committee report and recommendations eventually led to the
issuance of Executive Order 11,49155 signed by President Nixon in
1969. The order established a Federal Labor Relations Council 5 6 con-
sisting of the Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and other officials of the executive branch as designated by the Presi-
dent.57 The FLRC was to administer and interpret the order, decide
47. Id. § 12.
48. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 63.
49. Id.
50. Id. During the seven years of Executive Order 10,988 (1962-69), unionization in the fed-
eral sector had grown from twenty-nine exclusive units representing 19,000 employees in the De-
partment of Interior and the TVA to 2,305 exclusive units covering 1,416,073 employees in thirty-
five federal agencies. Fifty-two percent of the total federal workforce subject to the order was
represented by employee organizations which had achieved exclusive representation status. There
were, in addition, approximately 2,000 units which had gained formal or informal recognition.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. There were administrative difficulties in maintaining appropriate distinctions in the
three types of recognition and in dealing fairly with disputes. The committee recommended estab-
lishment of a Federal Labor Relations Council consisting of the Secretary of Labor, Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, an official of the executive office, and other officials as the President
may choose to oversee the program, decide issues, hear appeals, and make recommendations for
program improvement. Id. at 64.
53. Id. at 70. It was recommended that the scope of bargaining be expanded to include
negotiation of arrangements for employees adversely affected by realignment of the workforce or
technological change. Agencies were encouraged to increase their delegations of authority to local
managers to permit a broader scope of negotiations. Id.
54. Id. at 68-69. It was recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Man-
agement Relations be assigned the responsibility of handling unfair labor practice complaints,
supervising elections, and determining unit and representation disputes. Id. at 69.
55. 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (1969).
56. Hereinafter referred to as the FLRC.
57. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 194 (1969).
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major policy issues, prescribe regulations, and make recommendations
to the President on program improvements.5 8 Executive Order 11,491
provided for exclusive recognition only, to be determined by the vote of
a majority of employees in an appropriate unit.59 The order provided
that such a recognized organization had the right to meet with the
agency at reasonable times to confer in good faith with respect to per-
sonnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions. 60
National consultation rights, similar to those previously granted to for-
mally recognized unions, were to be accorded any organization repre-
senting a substantial number of employees.
6'
The order devised a system to settle negotiation disputes. Since
federal labor organizations were not allowed to call, engage in, or con-
done either a strike, work stoppage or slow-down, or to picket an
agency, 62 some procedure was required to resolve an impasse that
would develop during contract negotiations. In the public sector, strike
substitutes have long been considered essential. The Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service, available to the private sector, was re-
quired to extend its services to federal agencies. 63 When the FMCS
mediation services failed, the parties could invoke the services of the
Federal Services Impasses Panel,64 which was empowered to settle the
impasse by "appropriate action. ' ' 65 The parties could resort to arbitra-
tion or other third party fact finding only upon the authorization of the
FSIP.66 Under the order, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor
Management Relations was responsible for deciding appropriate bar-
gaining units, supervising elections, deciding unfair labor practice com-
plaints, and determing questions as to whether a grievance is subject to
58. Id. § 4(b). The FLRC was also given authority to decide appeals on negotiability issues,
exceptions to arbitration awards, and other matters it may deem appropriate. Id. § 4(c).
59. Id. §§ 7(a), 7(0, 10(a). An election was not necessary "where the appropriate unit is
established through the consolidation of existing exclusively recognized units represented by that
organization." Id. § 10(a).
60. Id. § 11.
61. Id. § 9.
62. Id. § 19(b)(4).
63. Id. § 16. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is hereinafter referred to as
FMCS. Section 158 of the National Labor Relations Act requires the party seeking to terminate
or modify the bargaining agreement to give notice to the FMCS within thirty days after initial
notice to the other party. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1976).
64. Hereinafter referred to as the FSIP.
65. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 17, 3 C.F.R. 201 (1969). The order established the FSIP as an
agency within the FLRC. It consists of at least three members appointed by the President who are
to consider negotiation impasses, take necessary action to settle impasses, and prescribe adminis-
trative regulations. Id. § 5.
66. Id. § 17.
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a negotiated grievance procedure. 67 The Civil Service Commission was
required to provide training and guidance to management officials and
review the program operations.
68
In contrast to the one administrative agency governing private sec-
tor labor relations,69 five organizations were involved in the adminis-
tration of the federal program: the Federal Labor Relations Council
(FLRC), the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the
Federal Services Impasses Panel (FSIP), the Assistant Secretary of La-
bor for Labor Management Relations, and the Civil Service Commis-
sion.
One year later, in 1970, the FLRC conducted an intensive study as
directed by President Nixon. Their report recommended that the order
be revised.70 President Nixon signed Executive Orders 11,61671 and
11,63672 as amendments to the original order.73 The amendments pro-
vided that every negotiated agreement contain a grievance procedure to
cover the interpretation and application of the agreement. 74 In the
past, the inclusion of a grievance procedure was permitted but not re-
quired. The amendments further provided that labor and management
could negotiate the use of official time for union contract negotia-
tions. 75 Finally, a provision was made for the withholding of union
dues by the agency.
76
The FLRC again assessed the status of the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Program in January, 1975. 77 Their report and recommendations
provided the impetus for Executive Order 11,83878 signed by President
Ford in 1975. This order provided that the coverage and scope of a
grievance procedure would be, for the most part, negotiable between
the parties, and removed the limitation to restrict usage to interpreta-
tion of the agreement. 79 The 1975 order also opened up agency regula-
67. Id§6.
68. Id. § 25.
69. The National Labor Relations Board was established by section 3 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). However, the services of the FMCS are available for nego-
tiation disputes and are mandatory in national emergency disputes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1976).
70. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 55.
71. 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (1971).
72. Id. at 24,901.
73. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 5.
74. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 13, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1971).
See 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (1971).
75. Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 20, 3 C.F.R. 204 (197 1). However, the amount of official time
was limited to a maximum of forty hours by the executive order.
76. Id.§21.
77. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 27-52.
78. 40 Fed. Reg. 5,743 (1975).
79. Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 13, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1971). There were still some matters excluded
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tions to the bargaining process under the compelling need doctrine.
Formerly, various levels of governmental agencies would prescribe in-
ternal regulations on personnel policies and working conditions.80
These regulations limited negotiations on the issues. Executive Order
11,838 provided that such agency regulations would not bar negotia-
tions on the same topic unless the agency could present a compelling
need for adherence to the regulation.8'
The Federal Labor Relations Program had evolved through five
Presidents and fifteen years of review and reports. Under Executive
Order 11,491, an exclusive union representative had the right to act for
and negotiate agreements for bargaining unit employees. 82 As in the
private sector, an organization accorded exclusive recognition repre-
sented the interests of all employees in the unit without regard to union
membership. 83 In contrast to the private sector, management was not
obligated to meet and confer on all terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 84 Items such as positions of employees, tours of duty, or technol-
ogy of performed work were excluded from federal sector bargaining.
Management in the federal government also retained the right to direct
employees, hire, promote, transfer, suspend, demote, or discharge, and
determine the methods and means to carry out the mission of the
agency.
85
The executive order declared that employees have the right to or-
from grievance coverage. These included matters for which there existed a statutory appeals pro-
cedure-removals, discrimination complaints, denial of step increases, unsatisfactory performance
ratings, to name a few. Id.
80. Id. For a discussion of how these regulations limited bargaining and arbitration awards,
see Kagel supra note 45.
81. Exec. Order No. 11,838 § 13, 3A C.F.R. 129 (1975). The final executive order issued in
the Federal Labor Relations Program was Exec. Order No. 12,107, issued by President Carter on
December 28, 1978. 3 C.F.R. 264 (1978).
This executive order was President Carter's implementation of his Reorganization Plan No.
2, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1978). This order aided in the implementation of title VII of the Act, which was
signed in October 1978. The order established the Federal Labor Relations Authority and the
Office General Council (OGC) to administer the program. Exec. Order No. 12,107 §§ 1-4, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1978). The previous FLRC was abolished. The new Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority was to be a three-member panel appointed by the President with concurrence by the Sen-
ate. Reorg. Plan No. 2 § 304(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 327 (1978).
82. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 10(e), 3 C.F.R. 192 (1969).
83. Id. In the private sector, the duty of fair representation is imposed as a duty correlative
to the right of exclusive representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
84. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that a selected representative
shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Compare Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 1 l(b), 3 C.F.R.
198 (1969), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838 § 1 l(b), 3A C.F.R. 126 (1975).
85. Exec. Order No. 11,491 §§ l(a), 11(b), 3 C.F.R. 192, 198 (1969).
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ganize, 86 but not to strike. The retained management rights and the
prohibition against federal employees' use of concerted economic pres-
sure meant that full collective bargaining rights were not available in
the federal sector. Nonetheless, the programs developed under the ex-
ecutive orders had come a long way from the gag rule. Federal em-
ployee rights, although limited, were firmly established.
87
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Unionism had grown considerably under the administration of the
executive orders. In 1963, 180,000 employees were represented by un-
ions holding exclusive recognition rights. 88 The years between 1964
and 1968 revealed annual percentage gains of twenty-seven percent to
forty-five percent. 89 Although the rapid growth of unionism had lev-
eled off by 1976, there were 1.2 million non-postal executive branch
employees represented by unions with exclusive representation rights
in 1978. This represented sixty percent of the executive branch em-
ployee population.90 Exclusive recognition covered eighty-five percent
of general schedule (white collar) employees.91 Ninety-one percent of
all employees under exclusive recognition were covered by negotiated
agreements.92 The AFL-CIO Affiliate, American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees, represents the largest number of unionized em-
ployees - 687,965. The independent National Federation of Federal
Employees is second with 138,672 employees represented.93
With the large number of federal employees unionized, the time
was ripe for labor relations reform. In the past, various members of
Congress had introduced legislation on behalf of federal employee la-
bor groups.94 These proposals failed.95 In 1977, there was renewed
congressional attempt to replace Executive Order 11,491 with a labor
86. Id. §§ 1(a), 19(b)(4). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides the same
right with the proviso that the right to refrain from any or all of these activities may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. This
same section allows private sector employees to strike. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
87. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
88. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
Union Recognitions and Agreements in the Federal Government, FED. PERSONNEL MANUAL BULL.
No. 711-77 (1979).
89. Id.
90. This excludes postal employees. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Legislation was introduced in the 82d, 84th, and 86th sessions of Congress. 124 CONG.
REC. 14,278 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978).
95. Id.
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relations statute. Federal labor union leadership, both AFL-CIO affili-
ated and independent, felt that successful congressional action was now
possible with the Democratic Party in control of both executive and
legislative branches of the government.
96
Major criticism of Executive Order 11,491 concerned its inefficient
responses to emergencies and the ill-defined relationship between the
five organizations administering the program. 97 The FLRC, the pro-
gram's primary administrative body, was composed of part-time, man-
agement-oriented officials. 98 The Federal Labor Relations Program,
established by executive order, was unenforeceable in court and subject
to unilateral change or termination by the President.99 Therefore, with
growing unionism, increased criticism of the executive order, the Presi-
dent's commitment to reform, and the democratic control of Congress,
conditions were propitious for major reform.
Civil Service Reform
It has been said that were it not for the Civil Service Reform Act,
of which the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute was
one title,1°° there would never have been a labor relations statute.' 0 '
96. See 4B.4 Report, supra note 5, at 153.
97. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (1974).
98. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 194 (1975). Robert E. Hampton, former Chair-
man of the Civil Service Commission, believed that the FLRC was intended to be a representative
of the President, not an impartial administrator. See 17 FED. BAR NEWS 70 (1970).
99. See Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). See generally Kennedy & Johnson, supra note 15, at 115-20; Hamp-
ton, supra note 17, at 499 n.7. The threat of unilateral action on the part of the President was
"more imagined than real." Frazier, supra note 2, at 133.
The most perceptive criticism of the executive order was levelled by one of its administrators:
The truth is that there is precious little real collective bargaining in the federal sec-
tor-and far too much collective begging.
The truth is that the executive orders, while well intentioned, will one day be re-
placed by legislation.
The truth is that unions have generally chosen to use their resources where they will
do the most good--on Capitol Hill-rather than fritter them away in the frustrating
battle against management rights and the sovereignty of government ...
The reason there is so little true collective bargaining in the federal sector is because
there is so little that can be bargained for.
Congress preempts the economic issues ...
Many of the primary noneconomic issues--seniority, job transfers, discipline, pro-
motion, the agency shop, and the union shop, are nonnegotiable-because of a combina-
tion of law, regulation, management rights, and the thousands of pages in the Federal
Personnel Manual.
Address by W. J. Usery, Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Director, Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, to the Collective Bargaining Symposium for Labor Relations Execu-
tives, Warrenton, Va., July 8, 1974, printed in 4 LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 22 (2 ed.
1975).
100. See note 6 supra.
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The impetus for reform had little to do with the federal labor relations
program. Rather, reform of the system was sparked by public opinion
that federal employees were underworked and overpaid. 10 2 Ralph Na-
der provided reasoned appeal to reform for the public interest:
The reform of our Federal civil service system is a paramount
consumer issue, defined broadly, for millions of people in this coun-
try who look to the Federal civil servants to protect them from can-
cerous additives in food, filth in meat products, defects in cars,
radiation in television sets, flammability in clothes, poisons in air and
water, and monopoly prices in all goods and services ...
People also look to Federal servants to wisely spend 20 or 30
percent of their income which they pay to the Federal Government
in taxes. They look to the civil servants to see that their mail is
promptly delivered, their bank deposits insured, their energy needs
met; in short, effective, efficient, honest, patriotic, committed, hard-
working Federal employees are a basic consumer interest in this
country. 103
The reform of the Civil Service structure overshadowed labor rela-
tions reform. The chief interests lay in policies concerning hiring,
firing, and paying federal employees. 104 The entire Civil Service Re-
form Act was passed in just one year. 0 5 Few of the provisions dealing
with labor-management relations were debated by either the House or
the Senate. There is a dearth of legislative history on the specific mean-
ing of the labor relations provisions.
0 6
101. Frazier, supra note 2, at 133. Frazier also finds the reverse to be true: were it not for the
union support for the labor relations title, there may not have been a Civil Service Reform Act.
102. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978. Hear-
ings on S. 2640, S. 2707 & S. 2830 Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (statement of Senator Charles H. Percy), 85 (statement of Alan F. Campbell), 392
(statement of James L. Sundquist), 404 (statement of Ralph Nader) (1978).
103. Id. at 403-04.
104. For the relationship of pay and personnel policies to collective bargaining, see note 99
supra.
105. Rep. J. Hanley, Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee (D-
N.Y.) caustically criticized the White House for excessive haste in Civil Service Reform. [1979]
818 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 5.
106. The newly-created FLRA, however, must find specific meaning in order to fulfill its stat-
utory mandate in deciding representation cases, unfair labor practice cases, negotiability disputes,
and arbitration appeals. Frazier, supra note 2, at 132-34. Rep. Frazier stated his views of this
process:
How will the Federal Labor Relations Authority carry out its function of determin-
ing that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute means and how it
applies to agencies and unions in the federal sector? The FLRA will establish the mean-
ing of the statute, for the most part, on a case-by-case basis, just as the Federal Labor
Relations Council and the Assistant Secretary have determined the meaning of the Exec-
utive Order and as the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have
established the meaning of the NLRA since its passage over 40 years ago. ...
When a dispute arises between an agency and a union over the meaning and appli-
cation of the statute, the FLRA will resolve that dispute by interpreting the statute and
the intent of Congress with respect to the particular provision in dispute. To ascertain
congressional intent, the FLRA will attempt to reconstruct the sometimes tortuous path
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Presidential Task Force Recommendations
As a first step to reform, President Carter requested and received
from Congress the authority to implement changes in the organization
of federal agencies, subject only to congressional veto. 07 Under this
authority, the President, in June 1977, established the Federal Person-
nel Management Project to review the federal civil service and make
recommendations for reform.'0 8 The project, staffed primarily by fed-
eral civil servants, was completed after five months. 0 9 The recommen-
dations of the task force on the federal labor relations system took a
conservative approach to federal labor-management relations; an ap-
proach consistent with the priorities and policies embodied in previous
executive orders." 10
The task force recommended the establishment of one central
body to administer the program, instead of five administrative bod-
ies."'I It also recommended there be no change in the scope of bargain-
ing and impasse procedures. 1' 2 Although not one of the original four
areas of concern, the group recommended an "agency shop" arrange-
ment, whereby unions and agencies could negotiate representation fees
for employees who were not dues-paying members. 1 3 This provision
was intended to provide union security without requiring employees to
join the union. The unions had contended that because of their obliga-
tion to represent all employees fairly, they should be able to collect fees
from non-members."t 4 The task force remained committed to a pro-
which the particular provision in dispute took through the legislative process. The deci-
sion of the FLRA will not depend on what agencies or unions wish Congress had in-
tended or on what agencies or unions think the law ought to be. The FLRA is interested
in what the law is.
Id. at 132.
107. ABA Report, supra note 5, at 153.
108. Id.
109. H. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2724. The project was divided into nine functional task forces, one of which was to ex-
amine ways to improve the federal labor relations system. I PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT,
THE PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PLAN, FINAL STAFF REPORT [hereinafter referred to as PER-
SONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT]. Under the management of Professor Chester A. Newland of
the University of Southern California and his senior consultant, Professor Emeritus Frank Mc-
Culloch, former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, the seven-member task force
was asked to examine four areas: central organization for labor relations; organization of the
employer and employee/employer relationships; scope of bargaining; and impasse resolution.
AB,4 Report, supra note 5, at 153. An option paper was published in September 1977 and after
outside comment and reaction, the final recommendations were submitted in December 1977. Id.
110. See ABA Report, supra note 5, at 153.
111. Id. The five bodies included the FLRC, the FMCS, the FSIP, the Secretary of Labor for
Labor-Management Relations, and the Civil Service Commission.
112. See generally PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT supra note 109.
113. Id. at 176-77.
114. 1978 Cong. Q. Almanac 831-32.
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gram of relying on executive orders and did not propose legislation. 15
Clay-Ford Bills.: Independent Congressional Attempts
At the same time that the reorganization task force was assessing
the federal labor relations program, Congress was actively considering
two major pieces of federal employee collective bargaining legislation.
In March 1977, the Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service was reviewing H.R. 13, sponsored by
Representative William Clay (D-Missouri) and H.R. 1589, sponsored
by Representative William D. Ford (D-Michigan). 16 Both bills repre-
sented a significant departure from the policies embodied in the previ-
ous executive order. Representative Clay commented "[tihe Federal
labor-management relations program is overly management-oriented
and places management at an unfair advantage over employees. The
program, because it is authorized by Executive Order, is too susceptible
to the whims of an incumbent President. The program is too limited in
its scope."'17
Both bills greatly expanded the scope of bargaining compared to
Executive Order 11,491. The bills dealt with such matters as pay prac-
tices, work hours, promotion and overtime procedures, seniority, disci-
pline, and detail and leave practices." 8 The bills also provided for an
"agency shop," wherein the parties could negotiate payment of repre-
sentation fees as a condition of employment. 19 H.R. 1589 even legal-
ized strikes by federal employees. 120 Action on both bills was halted in
June of 1977 at the request of the Carter administration, which was
promoting its own task force study group.' 21 Interest in the expansive
bills was renewed in August 1977 when the House Subcommittee on
Civil Service combined both H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 to form H.R.
9094,122 known as the Clay-Ford bill. However, subsequent to the sub-
committee hearings, no further action was taken on the Clay-Ford bill.
115. AB4 Report, supra note 5, at 155. Note that as a political question consideration of this
matter was beyond the scope of the project.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Improved Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service.- Hearings on H. 13 &
HR. 1589 Before the House Subcomm. on Civil Service of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 95th Cong., ist Sess., 2 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings].




122. Hearings, supra note 117, at 1. The Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service has primary responsibility for civil service bills. AB4 Report, supra
note 5, at 151.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
President Carter's Legislation
On March 2, 1978, President Carter transmitted to Congress his
message on civil service reform, and included his draft of legislation.
He explained his purpose in revising labor-management relations:
The goal . . . will be to make Executive Branch labor relations
more comparable to those of private business, while recognizing the
special requirements of the Federal government and the paramount
public interest in the effective conduct of the public business.
It [the legislation] will permit the establishment through collec-
tive bargaining of grievance and arbitration systems, the cost of
which will be born largely by the parties to the dispute. Such proce-
dures will largely displace the multiple appeals systems which now
exist and which are unanimously perceived as too costly, too cumber-
some, and ineffective.1
23
Two months later, on May 10, 1978, the President's proposed labor re-
lations bill was submitted to both the House and Senate. 24 In submit-
ting his plan, the President explained the defects of the existing order:
The Civil Service Commission has acquired inherently conflict-
ing responsibilities: to help manage the Federal Government and to
protect the rights of Federal employees. It has done neither job well
An Executive Order now vests existing labor-management rela-
tions in a part-time Federal Labor Relations Council, comprised of
three top government managers. . . . This arrangement is defective
because the Council members are part-time, they come exclusively
from the ranks of management and their jurisdiction is frag-
mented. 12
5
President Carter's proposed plan centralized administration in the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, consisting of three full-time presiden-
tial appointees, along with a general counsel to handle unfair labor
practice charges. '
26
Title VII, as proposed, did not provide for negotiation of pay prac-
tices, work hours, or seniority. However, it did increase the topics sub-
ject to negotiation over those negotiable under the executive order.
The new legislation included such topics as grievance and arbitration
123. 36 Cong. Q. Weekly 658-61 (1978).
124. Cipil Service Reform Act of1978: Hearings on S. 2640 Before the Senate Comm. on Go Per-
mentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1978). The original bil did not contain a section on
labor-management relations. The President later proposed an amendment dealing with this sub-
ject. The amendment was to be incorporated as title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act and
entitled Labor-Management Relations. Id.
125. President Carter's May 23, 1978 Message to Congress Accompanying His Plan on Reor-
ganization of the Civil Service Commission, 36 Cong. Q. Weekly 1353 (May 27, 1978). Note that
when President Carter was speaking of the existing executive order, he was referring to Exec.
Order No. 12,107, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,055 (1978). See also note 81 and accompanying text supra.
126. Id.
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procedures, paid time for employee-union representation, work sched-
uling, assignment of overtime, health and safety programs, union dues
withholding, equal employment opportunity policy, and discipline pol-
icy. 127
The House did not approve the President's proposal. On July 10,
1978, after hearings and consideration of amendments,' 28 the Commit-
tee on Post Office and Civil Service, by a vote of eighteen to seven,
substituted an entirely new text for the administration's bill. 29
The committee believed that the labor-management relations por-
tion of the President's bill was essentially a codification of existing ex-
ecutive orders.1 30  The committee agreed that a statutory labor-
management relations system for federal employees must be estab-
lished, but it disagreed with the President's specific proposals.'
3' It
wanted the labor relations program to be expanded. Mindful of the
fate of H.R. 9094, the committee recommended the establishment of a
broad new program providing that the employees through their unions
"be permitted to bargain with agency management throughout the ex-
ecutive branch on most issues, except that Federal pay will continue to
be set in accordance with the pay provisions of title 5,132 and fringe
benefits, including retirement, insurance, and leave will continue to be
set by Congress."'
133
The civil service reform legislation came before both the House
and Senate between July and September 1978. A broad based support
for the House version of civil service reform developed in response to
the urgings of the American Federation of Government Employees and
independent unions.
34
On August 24, 1978, by a vote of eighty-seven to one, the Senate
passed its version of the Civil Service reform legislation, S. 2640.135
127. Id.
128. Id. The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service conducted thirteen days of
hearings on H.R. 11,280 from March to May 1978. Testimony was given by 203 witnesses repre-
senting the federal government, business, and other interest groups. At the conclusion of the hear-
ings, the committee met for ten days during June and July of 1978 to revise H.R. 11,280. Seventy-
seven separate amendments were considered. Id.
129. See House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, Report on Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, H.R. REPORT No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5385 (1976).
133. Id. The committee felt that their amended version of title VII of H.R. 11,280 "strikes a
proper balance between the public interest and the demands of citizens who are employees of the
Federal Government who wish to have a greater voice in the employment policies applicable to
them." Id.
134. [1978] 770 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 4.
135. [19781 774 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 8.
525
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The Senate version more closely resembled the President's original pro-
posal. The Senate version amended the administration's title VII, labor
management provision, in several ways. The Senate version required:
secret ballot elections prior to the imposition of a bargaining obligation
on any agency; decertification of any exclusive representative who fails
to take action to prevent a strike or slowdown; that employees hear
both sides of the representation question during election campaigns, as
long as there are no threats of reprisal of coercive conditions; and,
finally, it provided judicial review of FLRA Unfair Labor Practice de-
cisions. '
36
Since the House and Senate versions were incompatible, 37 the
measure then moved to the House-Senate Conference Committee.
There, most of the House provisions were agreed to, thus expanding the
rights of federal employees beyond those contemplated by the execu-
tive order. 38 Specifically, the conference committee gave federal em-
ployee unions more latitude in negotiations than the Senate had
provided. The conference report was presented to the Senate on Octo-
ber 4, 1978, and approved by voice vote. 39 The report was filed with
the House and on October 6, by a vote of 365 to 8, the House agreed to
the report. 40 Finally, on October 13, 1978, President Carter signed
into law the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.14' The law became ef-
fective January 11, 1979.142
FEDERAL SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS:
TOWARD THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL?
The full impact of federal labor-relations reform will not be re-
vealed until the new law has been defined by its application over
time. 43 The consensus of those involved in the reorganization of the
federal program is that federal employees deserve the rights granted to
private sector employees with only those limitations required by the
public interest. 144 However, there is no clear articulation of the content
or resolution of these conflicting goals. A comparison of title VII to its
136. 124 CONG. REC. 14,311 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978).
137. A comparison of the House and Senate versions of the legislation is set out in App. 2.
138. 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 835 (1978). The conference report became known as No. 95-1272
accompanying S. 2640. See [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 27.
139. [1978] 780 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 6.
140. [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 7.
141. 92 Stat. 1192, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1978).
142. [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 7.
143. See Apps. 2 and 3.
144. See, e.g., text accompanying note 123 supra.
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predecessor, Executive Order 11,491, as amended, as well as to its pri-
vate sector counterpart, may indicate the current balance between fed-
eral employee rights and the public interest. 1
45
In many significant ways, federal labor relations remains the same
as it was under the executive order programs. Management retains the
right, both directly and indirectly, through Congress to set rates of pay
and to hire and fire. Labor organizations in the federal sector are de-
nied union security rights notwithstanding the expanded duties of the
federal union in bargaining and processing grievances. As the legisla-
tive history makes clear, the new Act is not to be interpreted as al-
lowing negotiation of an agency shop or a union shop. Federal
employees cannot strike. The reform legislation requires federal em-
ployees to cooperate in impasse resolution, and each contract must pro-
vide for binding arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure.
These provisions emphasize that strikes in the public sector will not be
tolerated. But more important, the conservative aspects of the new leg-
islation reflect a public concerned with the fact that the awesome power
of unions will be abused in the federal government, all to the detriment
of the public interest.
Yet, federal labor relations has moved toward the private sector
model. The new program is administered by an impartial Federal La-
bor Relations Authority. This is a dramatic break from the past, when
administration was vested in the FLRC which, as constituted, was
management-oriented. Not only is there now impartial administration
of the rights and duties contained in the Act, but complaints of unfair
labor practices in the federal sector are now investigated and prose-
cuted by a general counsel; just as it is done in the private sector.
Under the old program, the complainant had the burden of prosecuting
the unfair practice charge. 46 Since the prosecution function has been
vested in the general counsel within the Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority, there is statutory recognition of the fact that the rights declared
in title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act constitute national policy.
It has long been recognized in the private sphere that declared em-
145. The conclusions reached in this section are supported at App. 3.
146. According to Ronald W. Haughton, the prior program's burden on individual complain-
ants is evidenced by the fact that only fifteen percent of the unfair labor practice charges were filed
by individuals, with the remainder filed by labor organizations; whereas in the private sector, up
to fifty percent of the charges are filed by individuals. Remarks of Ronald W. Haughton, Chair-
man, Federal Labor Relations Authority, distributed before the Labor and Employment Law
Committee, Chicago Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, November 14, 1979 [hereinafter referred
to as Remarks of Chairman Haughton].
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ployee rights are not merely personal rights, but are important public
rights as well.
The declaration of employee rights and what constitutes an unfair
labor practice in the federal sector mirrors the private sector provisions.
However, because of the abhorrence of strikes by the public in the pub-
lic sector, there are the provisions for strike substitutes, and it is an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization representing federal em-
ployees to refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures or to participate in
or condone a strike.
Most important in the reform act is that employee rights are now
enforceable in court, since the rights are based on statute rather than
executive order. 147 The FLRA may seek enforcement of its orders in
the United States courts of appeals, and any person aggrieved by any
final order of the FLRA may likewise seek judicial review. Compara-
ble provisions govern the private sector. Arbitration awards are to be
granted a finality similar to that obtained in the private sphere; legisla-
tive history makes clear that judicial review of arbitration awards is to
be modeled on the narrow scope of review available in the private sec-
tor. 1
48
Because federal employees can negotiate more topics than were
hitherto allowed, the role of the grievance procedure is thereby in-
creased: the more topics included in a contract, the more items requir-
ing interpretation and compliance. Union officials are granted official
time for negotiations and dues checkoffs are authorized. Together
these provisions expand the duties of the federal union while allowing
for only limited union security.
The new Act has firmly established the Weingarten149 concept for
federal service employees: a union has the right to be present at any
147. See App. 3. See also Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). Back pay and attorneys fees are available under 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976) to victims of
unjustified personnel actions. Although back pay is a common remedy in private sector unfair
labor practice cases, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), the award of attorney's fees is rare. See, e.g.,
Heck's Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 142 (1974). The new provision in the Civil Service Reform Act, which
is not a part of but refers to the labor relations title, applies to both unfair labor practice cases and
grievances. Again, back pay is a common private sector arbitration remedy, while the award of
attorney's fees is not. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d
ed. 1973).
148. Chairman Haughton noted that the federal statute may require arbitrators to defer to
applicable laws and regulations; arbitrators in the private sector, however, may rule that the inter-
nal law of the contract takes precedence over any external law. Remarks of Chairman Haughton
supra note 146.
149. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), established the right, upon employee's re-
quest, to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview which could result in
disciplinary action.
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investigatory interview if the employee reasonably believes the exami-
nation may result in discipline and requests such representation. How-
ever, the legislative history is explicit that private sector
implementation of Weingarten rights is not to be controlling in federal
sector implementation of those rights. 50
Although it is premature to assess the impact of the federal labor-
relations reform legislation, it does appear that employee rights have
been expanded under the reform act, and at no apparent expense to the
public. Further developments under the Act will be eagerly analyzed
by scholars, practitioners, bureaucrats, and public employees.
150. Section 7114(a)(2)(B) provides that:
[An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the op-
portunity to be represented at any examination of an employee in the unit by a represen-
tative of the agency in connection with an investigation if-(i) the employee reasonably
believes that the examination my result in disciplinary action against the employee; and
(ii) the employee requests representation.
5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1978). The plain language of this section suggests that the repre-
sentation right is conferred upon a union as an organizational entity. It has yet to be determined if
such right also extends to individual unit employees.
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APPENDIX I
SEQ UENCE OF EVENTS
1. Exec. Order No. 10,988 (Kennedy)
2. Exec. Order No. 11,491 (Nixon)
3. Exec. Order No. 11,616 (Nixon)
4. Exec. Order No. 11,636 (Nixon)
5. Exec. Order No. 11,901 (Ford)
6. H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 introduced
House Committee consideration (ultimately
halted at the request of the Administration)
7. Federal Personnel Management Project estab-
lished (Carter's review of the Civil Service
System)
8. H.R. 9094 considered (combining H.R. 13 and
H.R. 1589)
9. Final Report - Task Force, Federal Personnel
Management Project
10. President transmits CSC reform legislation to
Congress - no labor relations provisions
11. Title VII - Labor Relations Bill added to
reform legislation
12. Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate hearings on S. 2640
13. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of
the House hearings on H.R. 11280
14. Committee on Governmental Affairs approved
S. 2640, vote 11 - 2 (Report 95-696)
15. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
approved H.R. 11280, vote 18 - 7 (Report 95-
1403)
16. Senate approves S. 2640, vote 87 - 1
17. House approves H.R. 11280, vote 385 - 10
18. House-Senate Conference Report (Report 95-
1272) reported to and approved by Senate
(voice vote)
19. House-Senate Conference Report (Report 95-
1272) reported to and approved by House, vote
365 - 8
20. President Carter signs S. 2640, Pub. L. No. 95-
454
21. Exec. Order No. 12,107 (Carter)
22. Effective date of Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.


























COMPARISON OF SELECTED PRO VISIONS OF HO USE
BILL, SENATE BILL, AND COMPROMISE BILL
Senate Bill 2 Compromise Bill3
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
States that statutory protec-
tion of an employee's right to
organize, bargain collectively
and participate in decisions
which affect them through la-
bor organizations of their
choosing is in the public inter-
est because "such protection
facilitates and encourages the
amicable settlement of dis-
putes between employees and
their employers involving
conditions of employment"
and because such protection
"contributes to the effective
conduct of public business."
§ 7101(a).
States that the purpose of
the chapter is to "prescribe
certain rights and obligations
of the employees of the Fed-
eral Government and to es-
tablish procedures which are
designed to meet the special
requirements and needs of the
Federal Government."
§ 7101(b).
States that the "public in-
terest demands the highest
standards of employee per-
formance and the continued
development and implemen-
tation of modern and progres-
sive work practices to facili-
tate and improve employee
performance and the efficient
accomplishment of the opera-
tions of the Government."
§ 7201(a).
States that the statutory
protection of the rights of em-
ployees "to organize, bargain
collectively within prescribed
limits, and to participate
through labor organizations
of their own choosing in deci-
sions which affect them (1)
may be accomplished with
full regard for the public in-
terest (2) contributes to the ef-
fective conduct of public busi-
ness and (3) facilitates and en-
courages the amicable settle-
ment between employees and
their employers of disputes in-
volving personnel policies and
practices and matters affecting
working conditions."
§ 7201(b).
Combines the findings and
purpose of both the Senate
and the House. § 7101(a).
Adds that the provisions of
the chapter "should be inter-
preted in a manner consistent
with the requirement of an ef-
fective and efficient govern-
ment." § 7101(b).
1. H.R. 11,280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
2. S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
3. H. & S. CONFERENCE REP. No. 1272, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter sometimes
referred to in this chart as CR].
House Bill I
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE, con't
House Bill
EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS
Provides that "each em-
ployee shall have the right to
form, join, or assist any labor
organization, or to refrain
from any such activity, freely
and without fear of penalty or
reprisal," and that each em-
ployee shall be "protected in
the exercise of such right."
§ 7102.
Senate Bill
States the same purpose as
the House Bill § 7101(b) ex-
cept that the rights and obli-
gations of federal employees
prescribed by the chapter are
subject to the "paramount in-
terest of the public."
§ 7201(c).
Provides in addition that
"no employee shall be re-
quired by an agreement to be-
come or to remain a member
of a labor organization, or to




§ 7102(1) and (2). Conferees
emphasize, however, that
nothing in the conference re-
port authorizes, or is intended
to authorize the negotiation of




ployee," "agency," "labor or-
ganization," "dues," "author-











Does not define "dues,"
"collective bargaining agree-
ment," "conditions of em-
ployment," "firefighter" or
"United States" but otherwise
provides generally the same
definitions as the House Bill







Provides the President with
the power to issue an order
excluding any agency or sub-
division thereof from cover-
age under this chapter under
certain circumstances.
§ 7103(b).
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY (FLRA)
States that the FLRA is
comprised of three (3) mem-
bers, not more than two (2) of
whom may be adherents of
same political party. No
members shall engage in any
other business or employment
or hold another office or posi-
tion in the Government of the
United States except as other-
wise provided by law.
§ 7104(a).
Same provision as House.
§ 7203(b).
Adopts House Bill. § 7104.
LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
House Bill
Members of the authority
to be appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate and may be
removed by the President
only upon notice and hearing
and only for misconduct, inef-
ficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office. The
President shall designate one
member to serve as chairman
of the authority. § 7104(b).
Provides that one of the
original members of the au-
thority shall be appointed for
a term of one (1) year, one for
a term of three (3) years, and
the Chairman for a term of
five (5) years. Thereafter,
each member shall be ap-
pointed for a term of five
years. § 7104(c)(1).
Notwithstanding the above
paragraph, the term of any
member shall not expire
before the earlier of-




Members of the authority
to be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate and
shall be eligible for reappoint-
ment. The President shall
designate one member to
serve as Chairman of the au-
thority. Any member of the
authority may be removed by
the President. § 7203(c).
Provides that the term of
office of each member of the
authority is five (5) years, ex-
cept that a member may con-
tinue to serve beyond the ex-
piration of the term to which
appointed until earlier of-
(I) the date on which the
member's successor has
been appointed and has
qualified, or
(2) the last day of the ses-
sion of Congress begin-
ning after the date the
member's term of office








(2) the last day of Congress
beginning after the date
on which the member's
term of office would (but
for this subparagraph)
expire. § 7104(c)(2).
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE AUTHORITY
Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to any regional direc-
tor, its authority to determine
whether a group of employees
is the appropriate unit; to con-
duct investigations and to
provide for hearings; to deter-
mine whether a question of
representation exists and to
direct an election; and to con-
duct secret ballot elections
and certify secret ballot elec-
tions and certify the results
thereof. § 7105(3)(1).
Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to officers and em-
ployees the authority neces-






Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to any administrative
law judge, appointed by the
Authority, its power to deter-
mine whether any person en-
gage or is engaging in an un-
fair labor practice.
§ 7105(e)(2).
Authorizes the Authority to
review any action taken by a
regional director or adminis-
trative law judge, who has
delegated by the Authority to
take such action, upon appli-
cation by any interested per-
son, filed within 60 days after
the date of the action. The re-
view, however, shall not, un-
less specifically ordered by the
Authority, operate as a stay of
the action. The Authority
may affirm, modify, or reverse
any action reviewed under
this subsection. If the Author-
ity does not undertake to
grant review of the action
within 60 days after the later
of: 1) the date of the action;
or 2) the date of the filing of
any application for review of
the action, the action shall be-
come the action of the Au-
thority at the end of such 60-
day period. § 7105(f)(1)(2).
Senate Bill
The Authority may con-
sider, in accordance with reg-
ulations prescribed by it, any:
I) appeal from a decision re-
garding the negotiability of a
proposal; 2) exception to any
arbitration award; 3) appeal
from any decision of the assis-
tant secretary regarding stan-
dards of conduct for labor or-
ganizations; 4) exception to
any final decision and order
of the Federal Service Im-
passes Panel; and 5) other
matters it deems appropriate
in order to assure it carries out
the purposes of this chapter.
§ 7204(c).
States that if a regulation or
other policy directive issued
by the Office of Personnel
Management is at issue in an
appeal before the Authority,
the Authority shall timely no-
tify the Director, and the Di-
rector shall have standing to
intervene in the proceeding
and shall have all the rights of







Authorizes the Director to
request that the Authority re-
open an appeal and recon-
sider its decision on the
ground that the decision was
based on an erroneous inter-
pretation of law or of a con-
trolling regulation or other





LABOR RELA TIONS REFORM
House Bill
"Unfair labor practice deci-
sions are appealable as in the
Senate. In addition, all other
final decisions of the Author-
ity involving an award by an
arbitrator and the appropri-
ateness of the unit an organi-
zation seeks to represent are




Makes reviewable in court
decisions of the Authority
concerning unfair labor prac-
tices, including awards of ar-
bitrators relating to unfair la-
boi practices. Otherwise,
the Senate bill provides that
all decisions of the Authority
are final and conclusive, and
not subject to further judicial
review except for questions
arising under the Constitu-
tion. §§ 7204(1), 7216(0,
7221(j).
Authorizes Authority to re-
quest from the Director of the
Office of Personnel Manage-
ment an advisory opinion
concerning the proper inter-
pretation of regulations or
other policy directives
promulgated by the Office of
Personnel Management in
connection with a matter
before the Authority for adju-
dication. § 7204(h)(I).
Compromise Bill
"In the case of arbitrators
awards involving adverse ac-
tions, the conferees elected to
adopt the approach in the
Senate bill. The decision of
the arbitrator in such matters
will be appealable directly to
the court of appeals (or court
of claims) in the same manner
as a decision by MSPB."
"In the case of those other
matters that are appealable to
the Authority the conference
report authorizes both the
agency and the employee to
appeal the final decision of
the Authority except in two
instances where the House re-
cedes to the Senate. As in the
private sector, there will be no
judicial review of the Author-
ity's determination of the ap-
propriateness of bargaining
units, and there will be no ju-
dicial review of the Author-
ity's action on those arbitra-
tion awards in grievance cases
which are appealable to the
Authority. The Authority will
only be authorized to review
the award of the arbitrator on
very narrow grounds similar
to the scope of judicial review
of an arbitrator's award in the
private sector." In light of the
limited nature of the Author-
ity's review, the conferees de-
termined it would be inappro-
priate for there to be subse-
quent review by the court of









Provides that all expenses
of the Authority (including all
necessary travel and subsis-
tence expenses outside the
District of Columbia) in-
curred by members, employ-
ees or agents of the Authority,
will be allowed and paid on
the presentation of itemized
vouchers therefor approved
by the Authority. § 7204(g).
No comparable provision.
AREAS EXCLUDED FROM NEGOTIATIONS
Permits, but does not re-
quire, the agency to negotiate
on the methods and means by
which agency operations are
to be conducted. § 7106(b)(1).
Prohibits negotiations on
the issue of the number of em-
ployees in an agency under
any circumstance.
§ 7106(a)(l).
Requires the agency to re-
tain the right to make deter-




the methods and means by
which agency operations are
to be conducted."
§ 7218(a)(2)(E).
Permits the agency in its
discretion to negotiate on the






prescribe criteria and resolve
issues relating to determining
compelling need for agency
rules or regulations. Also au-
thorizes Authority to resolve
issues relating to the duty to
bargain in good faith, to re-
solve exceptions to arbitrator's
awards, and to take such other
actions as are necessary and
appropriate to effectively ad-




nothing in the bill is intended
to require an agency to nego-
tiate on the methods and
means by which agency oper-
ations are to be conducted.
Conference report fully
preserves the right of manage-
ment to refuse to bargain on
"methods and means" and to
terminate bargaining at any
point on such matters even if











Permits any agency and any
labor organization to negoti-
ate 1) procedures which man-
agement officials of the
agency will observe in exercis-
ing their authority to deter-
mine the mission, budget, or-
ganization, number of em-
ployees, and internal security
of the agency and 2) appropri-
ate arrangements for employ-
ees adversely affected by the
exercise of the authority.
§ 7106(b)( I )(2).
Senate Bill
Requires the agency to re-
tain the rights to "maintain
the efficiency of the Govern-






Conferees do not intend
thereby to suggest that agen-
cies may not continue to exer-
cise their lawful prerogatives




RECOGNITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Provides that any person al-
leging that 30% of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit
wish to be represented for the
purpose of collective bargain-
ing by an exclusive represen-
tative (if there is not an exclu-
sive representative already) or
that 30% of the employees in
the unit allege that an exclu-
sive representative is no
longer the representative of
the majority of the employees
in the unit, may file a petition
with the Authority to investi-
gate and decide whether a
question of representation ex-
ists. § 7111(b)(A).
Provides that if after 45-day
period (which begins to run
on the date the petition was
filed) issues concerning the
appropriateness of the unit,
the eligibility of an employee
to vote, etc., remain un-
resolved, the Authority can
direct election by secret ballot.
§ 7111(2)(A).
Provides that the Authority
can decide questions submit-
ted to it with respect to the ap-
propriate unit for purposes of
exclusive recognition and with
respect to any related issue.
§§ 7204(b)(1); 7214(b).
Authorizes elections to be
held to determine whether to
recognize or replace an exclu-







Provides that a labor organ-
ization under certain circum-
stances may intervene with re-
spect to a petition filed for
representation by another or-
ganization and may be placed
on the ballot with respect to
organization which filed peti-
tion. § 7111 (c).
Authorizes runoff election
between two choices receiving
highest number of votes if no
choice on the ballot receives
majority of votes cast.
§ 7111 (d)(2).
Provides that a labor organ-
ization may be certified as an
exclusive representative only
after it is determined that ma-
jority status was achieved
without any unfair labor prac-
tices and that no other ques-
tion of representation exists.
§ 711 l(e).
Specifies circumstances
under which exclusive recog-




to submit to Authority and
agency involved a roster of its
officers and representatives, a
copy of its constitution and
bylaws, and a statement of its
objectives. § 7111(g).
States that nothing in
§ 7111 is to be construed as
prohibiting the waiving of
hearings by stipulation for the























House Bill Senate Bill
REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Gives a labor organization
that "has been certified as the
exclusive representative the
right to be present at the em-
ployee's request at any inves-
tigatory interview of an em-
ployee by an agency if the em-
ployee reasonably believes
that the interview may result
in disciplinary action against
the employee." In addition,
the House bill requires the
agency to inform the em-
ployee of his right of repre-
sentation at any investigatory
interview of an employee con-
cerning 'misconduct' which
"could reasonably lead to sus-




Authorizes an agency to de-
duct dues from the pay of
members of a labor organiza-
tion whenever an employee in
the appropriate unit gives the
agency a written assignment
authorizing the deduction.
The House also specifies that
the allotment shall be made at
no cost to the exclusively rec-
ognized labor organization or
the employee. § 7115(d).
No comparable provision.
Prohibits an agreement
from requiring an employee
to become or to remain a
member of a labor organiza-
tion or to pay money to the
organization except pursuant
to a voluntary, written author-
ization by a member for the
payment of dues through pay-
roll deduction. § 7218(c).
Adopts House provision
with an amendment deleting
the House provision requiring
the agency to inform employ-
ees before certain investiga-
tory interviews of the right to
representation, and substitut-
ing a requirement that each
agency inform its employees
annually of the right to repre-
sentation. The conferees fur-
ther amended the provision so
as to give the labor represen-
tative the right to be present
at any examination of an em-
ployee by a representative of
the agency in connection with
an investigation if the em-
ployee reasonably believes
that the examination may re-
sult in disciplinary action
against the employee. The
conferees recognized that the
right to representation in ex-
aminations may evolve differ-
ently in the private and Fed-
eral sectors, and specifically
intended that future court de-
cision interpreting the right in
the private sector will not nec-





Requires that the agency
"consider" the views or rec-
ommendations of the organi-
zation and that the agency
shall provide the labor organi-
zation a written statement of
the reasons for taking
whatever final action it finally
adopts. § 7113(b).
Requires that the view of
an organization be "carefully
considered." § 7213(b).
Adopts House provision
with the understanding that
the required written statement







Makes it an unfair labor
practice for an agency "to pre-
scribe any rule or regulation
which restricts the scope of
collective bargaining, or
which is in conflict with any
applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement." § 7116(a)(7).
States that in the adminis-
tration of all "matters covered
by the collective bargaining
agreement the officials and
employees shall be governed
by any future laws and regu-
lations of appropriate authori-
ties, including policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel
Manual, and any subse-
quently published agency pol-
icies and regulations required
by law or by the regulations
of appropriate authority."
The House amendment does
not contain this provision.
§ 7213(a)(1).
GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES OR REGULATIONS
Gives any labor organiza-
tion "'which is the exclusive
representative of a substantial
number of employees' na-
tional consultation ights with
respect to such rules or regu-
lations whenever it affects
,any substantive change in
any condition of employ-
ment.' The procedures for
consultation are similar to
those which govern national
consultation rights in other ar-
eas." § 7117(d).
No comparable provision.
Authorizes, as in Senate
bill, the issuance of "govern-
ment wide rules or regulations
which may restrict the scope
of collective bargaining which
might otherwise be permissi-
ble under the provisions of
this title. As in the House,
however, the Act generally
prohibits such government-
wide rule or regulation from
nullifying the effect of an ex-
isting collective bargaining
agreement. The exception to
this is the issuance of rules or
regulations implementing sec-
tion 2302. Rules or regula-
tions issued under section
2302 may have the effect of
requiring negotiation of a re-
vision of the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to
the extent that the new rule or
regulation increases the pro-
tection of the rights of em-
ployees. See § 7116(a)(7).
Adopts House provision.
§ 7117(d)(l).
Senate Bill Compromise Bill
LABOR RELA TIONS REFORM
House Bill
ILLEGAL STRIKES OR PICKETING
No comparable provision. Provides that any labor or-
ganization which "'willfully
and intentionally' condones
any strike, work stoppage,
slowdown, or any picketing of
an agency that interferes with
an agency's operations shall,
upon an appropriate finding
by the Authority, have its ex-
clusive recognition status re-
voked." § 7217(e).
EXPRESSION OF PERSONAL VIEWS
No comparable provision.
House recedes to Senate
with amendment specifying in
greater detail the types of
statements that may be made
under this section. The provi-
sion authorizes statements en-
couraging employees to vote
in elections, to correct the rec-
ord where false or misleading
statements are made, or to
convey the Government's
views on labor management
relations.
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
Does not limit the em-
ployee to the negotiated pro-
cedures in the case of any type
of grievance. § 7121(a).
States that the expression of
"any personal views, argu-
ment, opinion, or the making
of any statement shall not
constitute an unfair labor
practice or invalidate an elec-
tion if the expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit or undue
coercive conditions."
§ 7216(g).
Provides that, except for
certain specified exceptions,
an employee covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement
"must follow the negotiated
grievance procedures rather
than the agency procedures
available to other employees




"As agreed to by the con-
ferees the provision will not
apply to instances where the
organization was involved in
picketing activities. The
amendment also specifies that
the Authority may impose
disciplinary action other than
decertification. This is to al-
low for instances, such as a
wildcat strike, where decertifi-
cation would not be appropri-
ate. In cases where the
Authority finds that a person
has violated this provision,
disciplinary action of some
kind must be taken. The Au-
thority may take into account
the extent to which the organ-
ization made efforts to pre-
vent or stop the illegal activity
in deciding whether the or-
ganization should be decerti-
fled." § 7120(f(1)(2).
"The wording of the con-
ference report is intended to
reflect the current policy of
the Civil Service Commission
when advising agencies on
what statements they may
make during an election, and
to codify case law under exec-
utive order 11,491, as
amended, on the use of state-











Does not authorize the par-
ties to negotiate over the cov-
erage and scope of the griev-
ances that fall within the bill's
provisions but prescribes
those matters which would
have to be submitted, as a
matter of law, to the grievance
procedure. § 7121(a).
"Authorizes any party to a
collective bargaining agree-
ment to directly seek a Dis-
trict Court order requiring the
other party to proceed to arbi-
tration rather than referring
the matter to the Authority."
The Senate has no compara-
ble provision. § 7121(c).
Senate Bill
Establishes procedure the
arbitrator must "follow when
considering a grievance in-
volving an adverse action
otherwise appealable to the
MSPB. In these instances the
arbitrator must follow the
same rules governing burden
of proof and standard of
proof that govern adverse ac-
tions before the Board."
§ 7221(h).
Provides that the scope and
coverage of the grievance pro-
cedures shall be negotiated by
the parties. § 7221(a).
No comparable provision.
Compromise Bill
Adopts Senate provision in
order to promote consistency
in the resolution of these is-
sues, and to avoid forum
shopping. § 7121(e). See CR,
supra note 3, at 157.
Follows House with an
amendment: all matters that
under "the provisions of law
could be submitted to the
grievance procedures shall in
fact be within the scope of any
grievance procedure negoti-
ated by the parties unless the
parties agree as part of the
collective bargaining process
that certain matters shall not
be covered by the grievance
procedures." § 7121(a).
House recedes.
All questions of this matter
will be considered at least in
the first instance by the Au-
thority. § 7121(b)(c).
ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS
No comparable provision. Authorizes OPM to inter-
vene in Authority proceedings
and to request the Authority
to reopen and reconsider a de-
cision by the Authority.
§ 7120(h)(3).
Deleted this provision but
stated that such deletion was
not intended in any way to re-
duce the ability of the OPM
or any other person to petition
for intervention before the
Authority or to petition for re-
consideration by the Author-




States that after voluntary
arrangements prove unsuc-
cessful, the parties may agree
to a procedure for binding ar-
bitration, rather than to re-
quire the services of the Fed-
eral Service Impasses Panel,
"but only if the procedure is
approved by the panel."
§ 7119(b).
Provides that if no excep-
tion to an arbitrator's award is
filed within the specified time,
the award is "final and bind-
ing." § 7122(b). Intent of
House in adopting this provi-
sion was to make it clear that
the awards of arbitrators,
when they become final, are
not subject to further review
by any other authority or ad-
minstrative body, including
the Comptroller General.
CR, supra note 3, at 158.
Other authority or adminis-
trative body, including the
Comptroller General. CR,
supra note 3, at 158.
Senate Bill
Provides that negotiations
on procedures governing the
exercise of authority reserved
to management shall not "un-
reasonably delay the exercise
by management of its author-
ity to act on such matters.
Any negotiations on proce-
dures governing matters
otherwise reserved to agency
discretion by subsection (a)
may not have the effect of ac-
tually negating the authority
as reserved to the agency by
subsection (a)." § 7218(b).
States that arbitration or
third party fact finding with
recommendations to assist in
the resolution of an impasse
may be used by the parties
only when "authorized or di-




Conference deletes this pro-
vision but wishes to empha-
size that negotiations on such
procedures should "not be
conducted in a way that pre-
vents the agency from acting
at all, or in a way that pre-
vents the exclusive representa-
tive from negotiating fully on
procedures. Similarly, the
parties may not indirectly do
what the section prohibits
them from doing directly."






cept to the extent inconsistent





cept to the extent inconsistent
with laws, rules and regula-
tions. §§ 7215(c), 7218(a).
Compromise Bill
Follows House approach
where there are similar differ-
ences due to the Senate refer-
ence to policies as well as
rules and regulations. Con-
ferees specifically intend,
however, that the term "rule
or regulations" be interpreted
as including official declara-
tions of policy of an agency
which are binding on officials
and agencies to which they
apply. The right of labor or-
ganizations to enjoy national
consultation rights also in-
clude such official declara-
tions of policy which are
binding on officials or agen-
cies.
No comparable wording. Specifically states that this
includes policies set forth in
the Federal Personnel Man-
ual. § 7218(a)(l)(A).
CERTAIN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Provides certain savings
clauses for employees princi-
pally in agencies under the
Department of the Interior
and the Department of En-
ergy who have traditionally
negotiated contracts in ac-
cordance with prevailing rates
in the private sector of the
economy and who were sub-
ject to the savings clauses pre-
scribed in Section 9(b) of Pub.
L. No. 92-392 enacted Aug.
19, 1972. § 704(d). CR, supra
note 3, at 159.
No comparable provision. Adopts House provison
with amendment: "As revised,
section 704(d) overrules the
decision of the Comptroller
General in cases numbered B-
L89782 (Feb. 3, 1978) and B-
L9L520 (June 6, 1978), relat-
ing to certain negotiated con-
tracts applicable to employees
under the Department of the
Interior and the Department
of Energy. This section also
provides specific statutory au-
thorization for the negotiation
of wages, terms and condi-
tions of employment and
other employment benefits
traditionally negotiated by
these employees in accord-
ance with prevailing practices









rizes and requires the agencies
to negotiate on any terms and
conditions of employment
which were the subject of ne-
gotiations prior to August 19,
1972, the date of enactment of
Public Law 92-392. Section
704(d)(1) may not be con-
strued to nullify, curtail or
otherwise impair the right or
duty of any party to negotiate
for the renewal, extension,
modification, or improve-
ments of benefits negotiated."
"Section 704(d)(2) requires
the negotiation of pay and
pay practices in accordance
with prevailing pay and pay
practices without regard to
chapter 71 (as amended by
this conference report), sub-
chapter IV of chapter 53, or
subchapter V of chapter 55, of
title 5, United States Code, in
accordance with prevailing
practices in the industry."
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX 3
COMPARISON OF SELECTED PRO VISIONS OF
Efficiency of Government is
improved by employee par-
ticipation in the formulation
of personnel policies. Pre-
amble.
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
I. Employees have the right
to form, join, and assist
any unions, or refrain
therefrom, without the
fear of reprisal. § l(a).
1. Management shall not:
(a) interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce em-
ployee rights.
§ 19(a)(1).
(b) discriminate in condi-
NO. 11,491, TITLE VII
AND THE NLRA
Tile VII, CSRA 2
Collective bargaining safe-
guards public interest, con-
tributes to effective business,
and facilitates settlement of
disputes. § 7101(a). The Act
is to be interpreted "in a
manner consistent with the
requirement of an effective
and efficient Government."
§ 7101(b).
1. Employees have the right
to form, join, and assist
any unions, or refrain,
without the fear of repri-
sal. This right includes
collective bargaining.
§ 7101(b).
I. It is an agency ULP to:
(a) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(a)(I).
(b) same or comparable
OF THE CSRA,
NLRA 3
It is the policy of the U.S. to
eliminate obstructions to the
free flow of commerce by
encouraging collective bar-
gaining and protecting self-
organization of workers for
negotiating terms and condi-
tions of their employment.
§1.
1. Employees have the right
to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to
bargain collectively, and
to engage in concerted
activities, or to refrain
therefrom; however, such
rights may be affected by
a union security agree-
ment. § 7. The right to
strike is both recognized
and regulated. § 8(b).
I. It is an employer ULP to:
(a) same or comparable
provision. § 8(a)(l).
(b) same or comparable
1. Oct. 29, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,616, Aug. 26, 1971,
36 Fed. Reg. No. 17,819; Exec. Order No. 11,636, Dec. 17, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,901; Exec. Order
No. 11,838, Feb. 6, 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 5743, 7391; Exec. Order No. 11,901, Jan. 30, 1976, 41 Fed.
Reg. 4807; Exec. Order No. 12,027, Dec. 5, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,581. This analysis does not
include Exec. Order No. 12,107, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 1055, because this last executive
order, as part of President Carter's reorganization plan, anticipates and incorporates many of the
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.
2. Civil Services Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1977).
3. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1977), [references are to sections of
the Act]. When appropriate, references are made to Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-167, 171-197 [abbreviated as LMRA] and to the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1977) [abbreviated as LMRDA].
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Exec. Order No. 11,491,
as amended
tions of employment
to encourage or dis-
courage union mem-
bership. § 19(a)(2).
(c) control or assist a
union, except for rou-
tine provision of serv-
ice on an impartial
basis. § 19(a)(3).
(d) retaliate for complaint
or testimony.
§ 19(a)(4).
(e) refuse to accord ap-
propriate recognition
to a qualified union.
§ 19(a)(5).





(g) refuse to negotiate
with a labor organiza-
tion accorded exclu-
sive recognition.
(h) no comparable provi-
sion.
(i) employers are gov-
erned by existing and
future laws and regu-
lations. § 12(a).
(j) no comparable provi-
sion.
2. A labor organization shall
not:
(a) interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce em-
ployee rights.





(c) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(a)(3).




but not specifically set
forth as a ULP.
§§ 7116(a)(8), 7111,
7113.
(0 same or comparable
provision.
§§ 7116(a)(5), 7113.
(g) same or comparable
provision.
§§ 7116(a)(5), 7111.
(h) to fail to cooperate in
impasse resolution.
§ 7116(a)(6).
(i) to enforce a regula-




(I) "otherwise fail or re-
fuse to comply with
any provision" of title
VII. § 7116(a)(8).
2. It is an ULP for a labor
organization to:
(a) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(b)(1).





















(h) no comparable provi-
sion. Strike alterna-
tive available to pri-
vate sector.
(i) no comparable provi-
sion because of the
private nature of the
employer.
(I) no comparable provi-
sion.
2. It is a ULP for a labor
organization to:
(a) restrain or coerce em-
ployees in their exer-
cise of § 7 rights, with
a proviso for union
security. § 8(b)(1).
(b) cause an employer to
discriminate on the
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an employee in the
exercise of such rights
§ 19(b)(2).




(d) call, engage in, or
condone a strike,
slowdown, or picket-






Fasser, 428 F. Supp.
295 (D.D.C. 1976).
(e) engage in race, sex,
age or national origin
discrimination.
§ 19(b)(5).
(f) refuse to consult, con-
fer or negotiate with
an agency. § 19(b)(6).
(g) no comparable provi-
sion.
(h) no comparable provi-
sion.
(i) same or comparable
provision. § 19(c).
3. No comparable provision.
Title VII, CSRA
§ 7116(b)(2).
(c) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(b)(3).
(d) call, participate, or
condone a strike,
slow-down, or picket-











civil service status, po-
litical affiliation, mari-





(g) fail to cooperate in
impasse resolution.
§ 7116(b)(6).
(h) to otherwise fail to
comply with title VII.
§ 7116(b)(8).
(i) to deny membership
except for failure to
meet occupational
standard or to tender
dues. § 7116(c).
3. Free speech proviso:
non-threatening
expression of opinion (I)
publicizing a representa-
NLRA
basis of union activity
or for nonmembership
in a labor organiza-
tion (except for failure
to pay fees). § 8(b)(2).
(c) no comparable provi-
sion.
(d) engage in organiza-
tional picketing in cer-





and hot cargo provi-
sions. §§ 8(b)(4), (7),
and (e).




cal 12 v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966).
(f) refuse to bargain col-
lectively with an em-
ployer, when the
union is the bargain-
ing representative.
§ 8(b)(3).
(g) no comparable provi-
sion. Strike available
to private sector.
(h) no comparable provi-
sion.





3. Free speech proviso:
non-threatening
expression of opinion
"shall not constitute nor
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ADMINISTRATI ON
1. Federal Labor Relations
Council (FLRC): consists
of (part-time) the Chair-
man of the Civil Service
Commission, Secretary of
Labor, Director of the
Office of Management
and Budget, and any
other official appointed
by the President, to ad-
minister and interpret the
order, decide policy is-
sues, hear appeals to arbi-
tration awards, negotia-
bility issues, and other
matters it deems appro-
priate. § 4.




granted to labor organiza-
tion winning majority
vote in secret ballot elec-
tion. No election is re-




tion election, (2) cor-
recting a false or mislead-
ing statement, or (3) in-
forming employees of the
government's labor rela-
tions policy shall not "(A)
constitute an ULP. . . or
(B) . . . grounds for the
setting aside of any elec-
tion .. " § 7116(e).
1. Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA): 3
full-time members, bipar-
tisan, appointed by the
President with Senate ad-
vice and consent, to be
removed only for cause,
serving 5 year staggered
terms; to administer the
law, determine appropri-
ate units, supervise elec-





official time for union
representation, and re-





within the FLRA, ap-
pointed by the Presi-
dent with Senate con-
sent, serves for a 5
year term, at the plea-






granted by a secret ballot
election with a majority
of employees. § 7111.
NLRA
be evidence of an unfair
labor practice." § 8(c).
1. National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB): ap-
pointed by the President
with Senate consent, for
staggered 5 year terms, to
be removed only for




tions, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, and ad-
minister the Act. §§ 3(a),
(b), 9, 10.
(a) General Counsel ap-
pointed by the Presi-
dent, with Senate con-
sent for a 4 year term,
investigates and prose-
cutes ULP's. § 3(d).
1. Representatives are "se-
lected" by the majority of
employees in the unit.
Selection may be by se-
cret ballot election or by
informal recognition by
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2. National consultation




developed by the FLRC.
§ 9(a).
3. Exclusive recognition
does not preclude em-
ployees from choosing
their own representative
in a grievance or appeal
action, except when a
grievance is covered by a
negotiated grievance pro-
cedure. § 7(d)(1).
4. A unit may be established
which will ensure an
identifiable community of
interest and promote ef-
fective dealings and oper-
ations. § 10(b).








but criteria developed by
FLRA, § 7113.
3. Same or comparable pro-
vision. § 7114(a)(5).
4. The FLRA determines
appropriateness of a unit
to ensure fullest employee
freedom in exercising
rights, identifiable com-
munity of interest, and
promote effective dealings
and operations. § 7112.





work, and employees in
security, audit work, or
employees administering
a law related to labor
relations. § 7112(b).
REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND DUTIES
1. When accorded exclusive
recognition, an organiza-




2. No comparable provision.
I. Same or comparable pro-
vision. § 7114(a)(1).
2. Union right to be present
at investigatory interview
if the employee reason-
ably believes the exami-
NLRAI
2. No comparable provision;
exclusive representation
only is allowed in the
private sector. § 9(a).
3. No comparable provision
although individuals may
present their own griev-
ance without the inter-
vention of the union, pro-
vided the union has been
given the opportunity to
be present. § 9(a).
4. The NLRB determines
appropriateness of unit to
ensure fullest freedom of
the rights guaranteed by
the Act. § 9(b). "Com-
munity of interest" is an
important criterion. See
Gorman at 69.





and those subject to the
Railway Labor Act.
§§ 2(3), (2). Management
and confidential employ-
ees excluded by common
law of the Board. See
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
1. Such a duty construed by
the courts as correlative
to right of exclusive rep-
resentation. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). However, duty
extends to all in unit not
only regardless of union
membership, but regard-
less of race or sex or any
other reason.
2. Such a right contained in
§ 7, according to NLRB
v. Weingarten, 416 U.S.
969 (1975). However, the
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1. An agency and exclusive
union must meet at rea-
sonable times and confer
in good faith on person-
nel policies, practices, and
working conditions, "so
far as . . . appropriate
under applicable laws
and regulations." § 11.
2. The obligation to meet
and confer does not in-
clude certain topics: mis-
sion; budget; organiza-
tion; number of employ-
ees; number, types, and
grades of position; tour of
duty; technology; security;
or higher level regulations
where there has been
demonstrated a compel-
ling need to maintain
such agency policies and
regulations. §§ 1 (a), (b),
12(b).
3. Each agreement is gov-
erned by existing or fu-
ture laws and regulations.
§ 12(a).




nation may result in dis-
cipline and requests rep-
resentation. § 7114(2)(B).
The agency must inform
employees of this right
annually. § 7114(3).
1. An agency and exclusive
union shall meet and ne-
gotiate in good faith for
the purpose of arriving at
a collective bargaining
agreement. § 7114(a)(4).
2. Management retains the
right to determine the
mission, budget, organiza-
tion, number of employ-
ees, security practices; to
hire, assign, lay off, re-
tain, suspend, remove, re-
duce in grade or pay,
discipline, assign work,
fill positions, and take
any action "necessary to
carry out the agency mis-
sion during emergencies."
Negotiations are not re-
quired on higher level
regulations where there
has been demonstrated a
compelling need to main-
tain them. An agency
may, at its option, negoti-
ate number, types, and
grades of employees;
work projects; tour of
duty; or technology or
manner of performing
work. § 7106. There is
no duty to reach agree-
ment. § 7103(a)(12).
3. Agreement shall not be
inconsistent with Federal
law or Government-wide
rules or regulations for
which there is a compel-
ling need. § 7117.
4. Employee rights include
the right to refrain from
joining a union. § 7102.
private sector right ac-
crues to the individual,
not to the union; more-
over, there is no duty to
annually so inform em-
ployees.
1. Employer and bargaining
representative must "meet
at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and con-
ditions of employment."
§§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3), and (d).
2. No comparable provision.
Management rights are
generally left to the bar-
gaining process. There is
no duty to reach an
agreement. § 8(d).
3. No comparable provision
because of the private na-
ture of the employer.
4. An agreement could
make membership a con-
dition of employment,
subject to state right to
NLRA
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I. An agreement must con-
tain an exclusive griev-
ance procedure, scope
and coverage of which
are to be negotiated, but
not include matters for
which statutory appeal
procedures exist. It may
provide for arbitration,
which can be requested
only by the agency or
union. §§ 13(a), (b).
2. Arbitrator's awards ap-
pealable to the FLRC
"under regulations pre-
scribed by the Council."
§ 13(a). Under the regu-
lations, awards were to be
sustained "on grounds
similar to those applied
by the courts in [the] pri-
vate sector. . .. . 5
C.F.R. 2411. 18(d).
DISPUTES AND IMPASSE
I. The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) provides assist-
ance in mediating negoti-
ation disputes. § 17.
1. An agreement must con-
tain an exclusive negoti-
ated grievance procedure,
scope and coverage of
which are to be negoti-
ated; it can include statu-
tory appeals matters. It
must not include griev-








which may be invoked by
management or the
union. Employees retain
the right to choose either
the negotiated grievance
procedure or an applica-
ble statutory appeals pro-
cedure, but not both.
§ 7121.
2. Arbitrator's awards ap-
pealable to the FLRA on
the ground that it is con-
trary to law, rule, or reg-
ulation, or "on other
grounds similar to those
applied by Federal courts
in [the] private sec-
tor .. " § 7122(a).
1. Same or comparable pro-
vision. § 7119(a).
work laws. §§ 7, 8(b)(l),
14(b).
1. No comparable provision.
"Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby de-
clared to be the desirable
method of settlement of
grievance disputes arising
over the application or
interpretation of an ex-
isting collective bargain-
ing agreement .. "
§ 203(d), LMRA. Con-
tractual clauses establish-
ing a grievance and arbi-
tration procedure are
ubiquitous, as a matter of
voluntary agreement.
Management agrees to
such clauses as the quid
pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike
for the duration of the
contract. See Local 174,
Internat'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
2. No comparable provision.
Arbitration awards judi-
cially reviewed on very
narrow grounds only. Ju-
dicial deference to an
award "so long as it




Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
1. Any party seeking to ter-
minate or modify a con-
tract must give notice to
FMCS; any employee
striking within the notice
period loses employee sta-




must give notice before
any strike or picketing,
and FMCS required to
NLRA
LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
Exec. Order No. 11,491,
as amended
Title VII, CSRA
2. Upon failure of FMCS
resolution, the Federal
Service Impasses Panel
(FSIP), at the request of
either party, may settle
negotiation impasses by
action it deems appropri-
ate. §§ 5(b), 17.
2. Same or comparable pro-
vision. § 7119(b).
act in health care dis-
putes. §§ 8(d), (g);
§§ 206-210, 213, LMRA.
2. No comparable provision.
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS" INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Internal democracy, fiscal
integrity and disclosure,
and freedom from corrupt
influence. §§ 7(b), 18(a),
(c).
2. Freedom from communist
control and advocacy of
overthrow of U.S. govern-
ment. §§ 2(e)(3), 18(a).
3. No comparable provision.
ADMINISTRATION
1. Federal Labor Relations
Council (FLRC): consists
of (part-time) the Chair-
man of the Civil Service
Commission, Secretary of
Labor, Director of the
Office of Management
and Budget, and any
other official appointed
by the President, to ad-
minister and interpret the
order, decide policy is-
sues, hear appeals to arbi-
tration awards, negotia-
bility issues, and other
matters it deems appro-
priate. § 4.
1. Comparable provision.





3. Assistant Secretary of La-
bor for Labor Manage-
ment Relations to pre-
scribe regulations con-
forming generally to
those in the private sec-
tor. § 7120(d).
1. Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA): 3
full-time members, bipar-
tisan, appointed by the
President with Senate ad-
vice and consent, to be
removed only for cause,
serving 5 year staggered
terms; to administer the
law, determine appropri-
ate units, supervise elec-





official time for union
representation, and re-




1. Comparable provisions in
LMRDA.
2. No comparable provision.
3. No comparable provision.
1. National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB): ap-
pointed by the President
with Senate consent, for
staggered 5 year terms, to
be removed only for




tions, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, and ad-
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(a) No comparable provi-
sion.
(b) Federal Service Im-
passe Panel (FSIP): 3
members appointed by
the President, to take
action to settle im-
passes. § 5.
2. Assistant Secretary of La-
bor for Labor-Manage-





decide unfair labor prac-
tice complaints, and de-
cide whether a grievance





within the FLRA, ap-
pointed by the Presi-
dent with Senate con-
sent, serves for a 5
year term, at the plea-





(b) Federal Service Im-
passe Panel: Enlarged
to 6 members, ap-
pointed by the Presi-
dent for 5 year terms,
takes action in negoti-
ating impasses.
2. See FLRA supra.
NLRA
(a) General Counsel ap-
pointed by the Presi-
dent, with Senate con-
sent for a 4 year term,
investigates and prose-
cutes ULP's. § 3(d).
(b) No comparable provi-
sion because of the
right to strike in the
private sector. §§ 7,
13.
2. See NLRB supra.
PROCEDURES
1. No comparable provision.
Complaints decided by
the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Labor-Manage-
ment Relations, § 6(a)(4).
29 C.F.R. 20315 (1979).
2. No comparable provision.
3. No comparable provision.
1. Complaints prosecuted by
General Counsel.
§ 7118(a).
2. Six month statute of limi-




tion and exception for
negligence of agent.
§ 7118(a)(4)(B).
3. General Counsel investi-






but sole exception relates
to military service.
§ 10(b).
3. Same or comparable pro-
vision § 10(b).
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4. No comparable provision.
5. No comparable provision.
6. No comparable provision.
7. No comparable provision.
8. No comparable provision.
9. No comparable provision.
Title VII, CSR4
4. If the General Counsel
does not issue a com-
plaint "because the
charge fails to state an
ULP," the GC must pro-
vide the claimant with a
reason for not issuing the
complaint. § 7118(a)(1).
5. Charges may be resolved
informally before the is-
suance of a complaint.
§ 7118(a)(5).
6. Hearings not conducted
according to the rules of
evidence. § 7118(a)(6).
7. Transcript to be kept of
the hearing. § 711 8(a)(6).
8. FLRA or designated
member shall decide case
on a preponderance of
the evidence.
§ 7118(a)(7).
9. When hearing examiner
finds that no ULP has
been committed, such
findings of fact shall be
written and the complaint
dismissed. § 7118(c)(8).
NLRA
4. If the complaint is to be
dismissed, the Board shall




6. Hearings conducted ac-









I. Agency and union may
agree that employee rep-
resentatives may negotiate
on official time up to 40
hours or one-half of ac-
tual time in negotiation.
The number of employee
representatives covered
shall not exceed the
number of management
representatives. Internal
union affairs are off com-
pany time. § 20.
2. Exclusive union; agency
and union may negotiate
dues withholding upon
employee's authorization,
which can be revoked at
6 mo. intervals. § 21.
1. Employees representing
exclusive representatives
are to be granted official
time for negotiations, in-
cluding impasse, in the
same numbers as are rep-
resenting management.
But internal union affairs
are to be managed off
company time. § 7131.
2. Exclusive union: agency
must deduct union dues
at no cost to union if so
authorized in writing by
an employee; authoriza-
tions can be revoked only
at I year intervals.
§ 7115(a).
1. No comparable provision;
left to the bargaining
process.
2. No comparable provision;
left to the bargaining
process.
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3. No comparable provision.
REMEDIES
1. Where appropriate in a
ULP case, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor-Man-
agement Relations may
require the violator (a) to
cease and desist, or (b)
"to take such affirmative
action as he considers ap-
propriate to effectuate the
policies of the order."
§ 6(b).
2. No comparable provision.
3. No comparable provision.
Title VII, CSRA
3. Where there is no exclu-
sive union, but one with
10% employee member-
ship; if the FLRA certi-
fies the petition, the
agency must negotiate
with the union solely con-
cerning the deduction of
dues. § 7115(c).
1. Where appropriate in
ULP cases, FLRA shall
a. cease and desist order.
§ 7118(a)(7)(A).
b. order to renegotiate a




c. order of reinstatement
with back pay, to be
paid by perpetrator of
ULP, whether the
agency or the union.
§§ 7118(a)(7),
7118(a)(7)(C).
d. any other order "as
will carry out the pur-
pose of this chapter."
§§ 7118(a)(7)(D),
7015(g)(3).
2. Upon issuance of com-
plaint, FLRA may peti-
tion an appropriate court
for temporary relief to
prevent ULP. The court
shall not grant such relief
"if it would interfere with
the ability of the agency
to carry out its essential
functions or if the Au-
thority fails to establish
probable cause that an
ULP is being committed."
§ 7123(d).
3. No comparable provision.
NLRA
3. No comparable provision.
1. Where appropriate in
ULP cases, the NLRB
shall issue a (a) cease and
desist order, and (b) shall
"take such affirmative ac-
tion including reinstate-
ment of employees with
or without back pay as
will effectuate the policies
of this Act." Back pay
may be required of either
the employer or the
union. § 10(c).
2. Upon issuance of a com-
plaint, the NLRB may
petition an appropriate
district court for tempo-
rary relief. § 10(j).
3. Suits for breach of con-
tracts may be brought in
district courts. § 301,
LMRA.
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1. No comparable provision.
2. No comparable provision.
3. No comparable provision.
4. No comparable provision.
5. No comparable provision.
1. Final orders of the FLRA
are reviewable in the
courts of appeals.
§ 7123(a).




by a final order.
§ 7123(a).






awards and unit deter-
minations are not re-
viewable.
§§ 7123(a)(1), (2).
c. venue: circuit in
which the person ag-
grieved by the order
resides or transacts
business, or in the
District of Columbia.
§ 7123(a)(2).
2. "The findings of the Au-
thority with respect to
questions of fact, if sup-
ported by substantial evi-
dence on the record con-
sidered as a whole, shall
be conclusive." § 7123(c).
3. Court of Appeals may
grant any temporary re-
lief "it considers just and
proper." § 7123(c).
4. Court of Appeals may af-
firm, modify, or set aside
the order of the FLRA.
§ 7123(c).
5. Order of Court of Ap-
peals reviewable in




§§ 10(e), (f). Arbitration
awards are reviewable in
district courts only on
very narrow grounds.
Board decisions in elec-
tion cases are not review-
able directly because they
are not final orders. AFL








5. Same provision. § 10(e).
NLRA

